Il possibile impatto dei rating emessi dalle agenzie e un’analisi dei giudizi sul debito sovrano emessi da Standard & Poor’s.(The potential impact of credit rating agencies: an analysis of Standard & Poor’s ratings of sovereign debt)

Marco Langiulli

Abstract


Ratings on sovereign debt issued by Credit Rating Agencies may have a great influence on investors’ expectations. During the European Debt crisis, peripheral Eurozone countries were repeatedly downgraded. According to many economists, these severe judgments were not always justified on the basis of economic fundamentals. In this paper we use econometric models to show how judgments became more severe after 2009 and that, during this period, some countries were systematically rated worse than others, independently of their economic fundamentals.

 

 


Keyword


Sovereign debt Ratings, debt crisis, ordered probit, Multiple Equilibria, Self-fulfilling prophecies

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Reg. Tribunale di Roma n.377/2009 del 19/11/2009