Europe’s Economic Problems in an International Perspective*

1. Introduction

What is Europe’s problem? This question is not a trivial one, nor should it be dismissed too lightly. Many are prepared to argue that some key European countries — and especially Germany — are now about to reap the fruits of policies aimed at “consolidation” of the budget and strict monetary control: spontaneous market-generated recovery of investment and consumption will fuel a durable expansion of output in a situation of price stability. It is, therefore, only a question of maintaining the present policy stance and waiting for the recovery which, thanks in part to the positive terms-of-trade developments, will certainly be buoyant especially with respect to consumer demand.

In order to comment on this scenario it is necessary to set the question in a broader framework of both time and space horizons.

2. Growth and Employment Trends

To start with, there can be little doubt that since the first oil shock Europe’s main problem has been that growth was insufficient and labour markets were too rigid to generate employment (Table 1). In 1973 total employment in Europe was 159.7 million, as against 87.3 million in the United States and 52.6 million in Japan. In 1986 the

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corresponding figures are estimated (Whaton, 1985, 1986) to be: 153.4 million (−3.9%); 111.6 million (27.8%) and 58.5 million (11.1%). The unemployment rate in Europe thus climbed from 3.9 to 12.0 per cent of the total labour force.

**Table 1**

TOTAL EMPLOYMENT AND RATES OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE 7 MAJOR INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES: 1973 AND 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Total employment</th>
<th>Unemployment rate</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(millions)</td>
<td>(percent of total labour force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>111.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>58.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>159.7</td>
<td>153.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WHATON, World Economic Outlook.

Recent empirical work on the development sheds light on the employment problem. Reference will be made in particular to statistical evidence collected by the OECD covering the period 1973-83 (Tables 2, 3). Four major points can be made.

First, there is a demographic problem: the labour force is growing at a slower pace in Europe than in the United States and in Japan. In the decade under consideration the labour force increased in the four major European countries by 5.9% as against 24.1% in the United States and 10.5% in Japan. Europe is, of course, a group of very different countries, a difference which extends to growth of the labour force: Germany stands out with a very small increase of 264,000, which is slightly less than in Denmark and approximately one-tenth the increase recorded in Italy.

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Limited growth in the labour force is of course a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it should make it comparatively easy to absorb new additions into employment; on the other hand, it lessens the incentives, especially for governments and trade unions, to pursue active employment policies and to increase labour market flexibility.

We come therefore to the second point: the decline in total employment in Europe. Over the decade employment fell by 0.2 million in Europe, while it increased by 14.4 million in the United States and by 4.9 million in Japan. In the four major European countries the absolute decline amounted to 1.2 million. Here again significant differences are present: employment rose in Italy and France, but declined by 1.9 million in Germany and 0.8 million in the United Kingdom.

Third is the point of origin of the decline in employment. As Table 2 indicates, it is industry which has registered the most severe shake-out. In the four major European countries 3.5 million jobs were lost in this sector. In absolute terms the largest decline is recorded in Germany: 2.2 million. In the United States and in Japan too the industrial sector underwent a significant restructuration, but with limited net labour shedding.

Manufacturing has been the industrial sector most affected by adjustment forces, and this is clearly related to the character of technological innovation in production techniques, mainly as a result of the introduction of computer-controlled machine tools. In all major countries employment in the manufacturing sector declined. It is clear, however, that Europe suffered the worst crisis. The four major European countries showed a 4.4 million decline in actual employment over the period under consideration, as against 1.5 million in North America and 0.3 million in Japan.

The fourth point is that services — private and public — are the source of new employment. In particular, employment in private services went up by 13.8 million in the United States, 5.7 million in Japan and 4.0 million in the four major European countries (0.3 million in Germany). Here also there are significant differences between the various countries: the two extremes are the United States and Germany; total employment in the services sector has increased by no less than 15.6 million in the former compared to just 0.9 million in the latter.

A key to the explanation of the diverging overall employment trends is to be found in these differential movements in the services sector. The German case is of particular interest for the European observer: it can indeed be argued that one of the roots of the weak European performance is the inability of the German economy to generate sufficient jobs in this sector!

Improper functioning of the labour market in Europe is a key element in this picture. The OECD study provides clear evidence of the importance of segmentation in the labour market in explaining employment trends. In particular, with low and declining relative pay in services, the unemployed from the industrial sector demand such a high reservation wage that they are unable to find a job in services. Countries like Germany, with (i) large losses in industrial jobs, (ii) slow growth of the labour force and (iii) large wage differentials between manufacturing and services (Table 3), can be expected to show a low expansion of overall employment. And all the more so if public spending (and therefore public employment growth) is kept under strict control.

While the downward rigidity of real wages after the first oil shock, in the face of the sharp terms-of-trade deterioration and productivity breaks, goes a long way towards explaining the rise of unemployment in the 70's; in the present decade aggregate real wage gaps have declined substantially in all major European countries. Traditional aggregate analysis of the relationship between nominal wage income, prices and adjusted productivity does not therefore appear adequate to explain the recent rise in the unemployment rate. The hysteresis approach to equilibrium unemployment and the specific insider-outsider models represent a useful line of analysis, but should be developed to account for sectoral employment structure and shifts.

While improved labour market functioning is central to achieving stronger employment performance in Europe, this does not imply that fiscal and monetary policies cannot play a role in sustaining more vigorous growth in a non-inflationary framework.

Here again, however, the entire question should be addressed by setting the European and especially the German case in a world context. Let us recall, to start with, that at current exchange rates Europe's nominal GDP is approximately nine-tenths of American output and

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3 For a description of these changes, see SIDDIQI et al. (1983).
4 See OECD, Economic Outlook, May, 1986.
5 See a review of these points see MEURIS and SINCLAIR (1983) and MORGUILLAN et al. (1986).
twice that of Japan. The output of the four major European countries taken together is nearly two-thirds and one and a half that of the U.S. and Japan respectively. This is simply to underline Europe’s continuing crucial economic role. More specifically, European countries can hardly deny that world economic developments are affected by their joint action.

On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that in practice the lack of economic integration and the fragmentation of economic policy make Europe highly dependent on economic policies pursued by the United States. Perhaps only Germany enjoys a significant degree of freedom in framing domestic economic policy.

3. Fiscal and Monetary Policies in a World Perspective

The second important element necessary to explain the weakness of the European economy does indeed lie in the interaction between the fiscal-monetary policy mix pursued in Europe, in the United States and in Japan: let us refer to some stylised facts which center on the interrelationships between saving and investment in the three major economies, and their interplay with sustainable balances of payments on current account (Tables 4 and 5).

Between 1981 and 1986, according to OECD estimates, the general government budget deficit increased in the United States by 2.4 percentage points with respect to GDP; it declined by 3.1 and 2.9 points in Japan and Germany respectively. If changes are computed on an inflation-adjusted, structural budget basis, the results are similar.

Comparable changes, in the opposite direction, were recorded by the current accounts of the balance of payments of the three countries.

Many factors no doubt combined to generate these shifts, which were accompanied by sizeable movements in exchange rates. I am convinced, however, that changes in budget policies in the three countries, together with the relatively stable financial balances desired by the respective private sectors, played a significant role. Clearly, this is so when account is taken of the fact that fiscal expansion in the U.S. was accompanied by restrictive monetary policies, which assured confidence in control of inflation and high real yields on financial assets.
The balance between total domestic saving and investment equals the current account position of a country; in turn total saving and investment are generated by aggregating the private and the public sectors. Solving in terms of the former we get:

\[ S - I = G - T + X - M \]

If private saving (S) and investment (I) are stable functions of a selected number of variables, which do not simultaneously "explain" variables on the right-hand side, equation (1) links the current balance \((X - M)\) to a fiscal policy tool \((G - T)\).

Note that when the exchange rate floats freely the current balance is equal to net capital outflows \((\Delta NFA)\); from the balance-of-payments identity we have:

\[ 2) \quad X - M = \Delta NFA \]

The total supply of funds available to finance (i) net domestic investment and (ii) the balance between current receipts and disbursements of the government sector thus consists of domestic private saving and foreign saving — as measured by recourse to international financial markets. Domestic private saving does not necessarily increase with rising interest rates, because of the interaction between wealth and substitution effects. Foreign saving is responsive to rising yields, thus making total savings a positive function of real returns.

Discarding "crowding in" and wealth effects, the inference from equation (1) is that an upward shift in the fiscal deficit will be matched by a combination of: (i) a rise in domestic rates, which tends to increase the financial balance of the private sector and (ii) a real appreciation of domestic currency, which tends to reduce the current account balance.

However, these adjustments in goods markets require time: in particular, as we know, the immediate impact of an exchange rate change has a perverse effect on the current account. The burden of adjustment in the short run therefore falls on asset markets, and notably on the exchange rate which will have to move sufficiently to restore equilibrium in the foreign asset market. In other words, it is the right-hand term in equation (2) that must adjust. This explains why the exchange is dominated in the short run by financial forces and can far overshoot the "fundamentals", especially if exchange rate expectations are temporarily affected by extrapolative forces.

Once we note that the financial balance of the private sector \((S - I)\) is equal to the difference between the changes in its financial assets \((\Delta FA)\) and its financial liabilities \((\Delta FL)\), we can rewrite equation (1) as follows:

\[ 1') \quad \Delta FA = \Delta FL + \Delta D + \Delta NFA \]

where \(\Delta D\) is the change in the public debt.
In financial terms, if a stable relationship exists between the stock of financial assets, income and other selected variables, net foreign savings will be tapped (ΔNFA<0) whenever the change in total domestic credit (ΔFL + ΔD) exceeds the desired change in total financial assets. The general point is that current account balances — and the corresponding capital flows — are strongly affected by fiscal policies: the significant imbalances in current accounts among the three largest countries are to be explained largely by the working of opposite budgetary shifts. These altered the aggregate balance between saving and investment and helped determine sizeable movements in exchange and interest rates. The contention here is that the underlying pattern of total domestic saving and investment in the three countries generated exchange rate, interest rate and trade repercussions that threatened the world payments system and jeopardized the possibility of achieving lasting internal and external stability.

That budget policy can influence the exchange rate is well-known; we have the classic result of Mundell-Fleming, according to which with floating rates and perfect capital mobility a fiscal expansion determines a real exchange-rate appreciation. But we also know that this is a short-run result. Once account is taken of the stock effects of cumulated current account imbalances, the initial impact can easily be reversed. After the initial appreciation, the exchange rate may have to fall, possibly below the original level, to generate a trade surplus sufficient to cover the interest rate burden on foreign debt:

\[ \Delta d = (r^e - g) d - b \]

where \( \Delta d \) is the change in the ratio of foreign debt to domestic income, \( r^e \) is the rate of interest (foreign rate for all countries except the U.S.), \( g \) is the domestic rate of growth, and \( b \) is the trade balance as a proportion of domestic income.\(^{7} \)

At the end of this year the net international debtor position of the United States will be well in excess of $200 billion, and available forecasts agree that with present exchange rates the debt is likely to rise to over $500 billion by the end of the decade. If the real rate of interest in the United States continues to exceed the rate of growth, the increasing burden of the debt will make it necessary eventually to record sizeable trade surpluses, in order to achieve a sustainable, consistent set of balance-of-payments positions. According to most available econometric models this will require corresponding policies of fiscal consolidation in the United States and possibly some further decline in the external value of the dollar.\(^{8} \) The extent of the domestic fiscal consolidation and even more so that of the exchange rate adjustment will of course depend on concomitant developments in the rest of the world, especially in Japan, Germany and other European countries.

As Tables 4 and 5 show, when account is taken of the respective weights of the three major economies, the cumulative fiscal stimulus in the United States in the six-year period 1981-86 was matched by a similar contraction in Japan and Germany taken together.

Assuming a continuation of present and prospective trends in the developing countries,\(^{9} \) a reversal of budget policy in the United States and a shift towards desired positions of current account balance and trade surplus would have to be countered by significant offsetting changes in the domestic saving-investment balances in Japan and Germany. Otherwise, there is the risk that globally the sum of desired saving will exceed investments, with adverse consequences for growth.

The question is whether these changes can take place without some relaxation in the stance of fiscal policy in Japan and in Germany; given the strength and stability of household's propensity to save in the two countries, and the likely impact of exchange rate shifts on investment, this is unlikely, especially if the risk of creating excessive pressure to ease monetary policy in the future is to be avoided.

It is appropriate here to recall briefly some features of past fiscal developments that have a bearing on these issues. Traditional textbook analysis shows that the shift towards a mix of easy fiscal and tight monetary policy — such as that pursued by the United States — leads in principle to a low-saving and low-investment (high consumption)

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\(^{7} \) For simplicity's sake, invisible items other than interest flows are neglected.

\(^{8} \) On these points see Feldstein (1986), Branson (1986) and Dornbusch (1986).

\(^{9} \) Note in this respect that tax reform in the United States reduces both tax shelter and real estate credit demand. Caretto peric, this will have a negative impact on the dollar.

\(^{9} \) This is clearly a second-best approach, which is predicated on the difficulty of rescuing substantial net credit flows to LDCs. Ideally, the move towards equilibrium in the current account position of the United States should be accompanied by an increase in net lending and direct investment flows from other industrial countries to LDCs.
equilibrium. The reverse mix would, on the contrary, imply an equilibrium position characterized by a rapid rate of capital growth.

In reality, the U.S. experienced strong capital accumulation in the past recovery, but the paradox vanishes when allowance is made for the peculiar features of the fiscal stimulus. The Economic Recovery Tax Act implied significant reductions in companies' tax rate on new investment. It has been estimated that the cost of new productive capital was lowered by 4 per cent, and that of new infrastructure by as much as 17 per cent. These measures interacted with the existing facilities for interest deductibility and provided a strong incentive to capital accumulation.16

The American policy mix, by raising world interest rates and absorbing saving, had a negative impact on investment in the rest of the world, notably in Europe. However, it was this partly tempered by the exchange-rate impact: real exchange-rate depreciation most certainly exerted a positive influence on investment spending in economies which were centered on export-led growth, such as Japan and Germany. The danger of the present situation is that unless real interest rates fall, the appreciation of their currencies will exert a strong negative pull on capital accumulation in these economies.

In Japan, in spite of the oil-price benefits, the expansionary phase of the economic cycle was not sustained in 1986, with investment, particularly in manufacturing, levelling off and exports declining.

In Germany, growth was weak during the first half of 1986: it is expected that consumer demand will be buoyant in the second part of the year and in 1987, helped by the windfall terms-of-trade gains in real disposable income — and thereby pull up total GDP growth. As for investment, available forecasts are more mixed.

A relevant variable here is the level of interest rates and, more generally, the stance of monetary policy. There are great difficulties, especially under present circumstances, in measuring the level of real interest rates. "Forward-dated" rates are likely to be more appropriate than "forward-dated" rates. There is, however, the problem of having to estimate such figures through price projections.

Some traditional backward estimates (Tables 6 and 7) are presented here simply to make the point that interest rates are very high by historical standards, and particularly so if cyclical and inflation conditions are taken into account. The actual estimates would even point to rising rates, especially on bank lending.

16 For an assessment of the ERTA see Johnson and Scannon (1987).
degree of monetary relaxation, especially in countries with large external surpluses.

### Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOMINAL AND REAL COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING RATES TO PRIVATE BORROWERS</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>(end-of-period data; N: nominal rates; R: real rates)</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>11.0</td>
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<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<td>I</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5.3</td>
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<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
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<td>7.6</td>
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<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
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<td>11.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Morgan Guarantee, OECD. Inflation rates are defined as percentage change of consumer prices in the previous twelve months.

With (i) negative current inflation and positive prospective growth in prices, and (ii) financial innovation leading to competitive returns on monetary assets, it is reasonable to expect an upward shift in the demand-for-money function. The recorded increase in the money stock may therefore reflect a portfolio shift; attempts to resist it by slowing monetary base growth would imply monetary restriction. On the other hand, nobody would be prepared to argue that the situation in Germany and Japan in 1986 is already one of liquidity trap, with money demand infinitely elastic at current nominal rates and thus with no possibility of lowering them.

4. Summary and Conclusion

The problems of Europe cannot be seen and assessed in isolation from the world context. International consistency and compatibility of external payments in a sustainable medium-term framework requires reciprocal monitoring — and possibly adjustment — of the policy mixes; the saving-investment and current-account approach is helpful in identifying economic interactions at the international level.

A reduction in the structural budget deficit in the United States is necessary: without this fiscal adjustment, devaluation alone will not produce the required changes in relative prices, nor induce a permanent shift between production and absorption. The problem is that the needed adjustment must not involve recessionary consequences and the appearance of abortive shift at the global level. Thus, once underway, the adjustment is likely to require some offsetting relaxation of the fiscal stance in Japan and in those European countries where budget consolidation action has already brought very low actual deficits and structural balances in broad equilibrium, if not in surplus. These shifts need not imply a resumption of growth in the public sector. The desired change can be achieved without running this risk either through reduced taxation of incomes or temporary fiscal incentives to (labour-absorbing) capital investment.

On the monetary side, some reduction in nominal interest rates is possible and desirable in Europe on both domestic and external grounds. Measured against current inflation rates, real interest rates, in certain European countries in particular, are now at historic peaks. The fact that they are low in nominal terms, and that inflation in some countries is negative, can also help explain an upward shift in the demand-for-money function. Strict adherence to quantitative nominal targets may therefore imply a restrictive monetary stance in these countries.

As has been argued, the key domestic European problem is employment. Demographic factors will alleviate the difficulties in the medium term; but this is no excuse for accepting present levels of unemployment. Beyond the question of an appropriate macro-policy mix, employment growth in Europe requires significant improvements to labour market functioning. Prices in the labour market fail to reach market clearing levels; individuals are subject to rationing, being unable to work the desired number of hours at the current real wage rate; inter-sectoral shifts in employment, required by changes in demand and methods of productions, encounter serious obstacles. On the other hand, wage moderation in the past few years makes it hard to argue that Europe is witnessing merely "classical unemployment", with excess supply in the labour market and excess demand in the output market. "Keynesian" unemployment is also present.

All in all, therefore, a clear case can be made that those European countries which have already achieved structural budget equilibrium...
and very low (or negative) inflation should discontinu
the restrictive
fiscal and monetary mixes which have been characteristic of the past few
years. Microeconomic adjustment of the labour market to improve its
functioning would be the appropriate complementary action in all
European countries to move towards better internal and external
balance.

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Did the Keynesian Revolution Retard the Development of Portfolio Theory? *

"Simplifying" as a Prefiguration of Tobin's Portfolio Theory

1. - In 1981 James Tobin was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Science for "his analysis of financial markets and their relation to expenditure decisions, employment, production and prices". It may be interesting to quote more extensively from the official announcement of the Nobel Prize as it gives a beautiful overview of Tobin's principal achievements which can then be compared with Hicks' Simplifying article. It is also an excellent illustration of the recognition of Tobin's work by the scientific community.

"Portfolio selection theory is used to study households' and firms' decisions to hold different real and financial assets and simultaneously incur debts. Tobin shows how these decisions are governed by weighing risk and expected rate of return...

By examining a broad spectrum of assets and debts, Tobin's analysis of the transmission mechanisms extends the channels of contact between financial markets and real expenditure decisions as compared to the studies of other researchers, who have dealt with similar questions... One of the most important aspects, neglected by earlier researchers, is the condition whereby the financial system is not comprised mainly of banks, but of numerous and diverse institutions with varying portfolio selection policies" (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 1981, pp. 57-58).

With this background it is interesting to have a closer look at Hicks' paper "A Suggestion for Simplifying the Theory of Money".

Hicks starts with explaining his background in value theory and expressing his astonishment that monetary theorists are only concerned with one equation.*

* I wish to thank Professor V. Van Rompuy for comments on an earlier draft. Responsibility for the views expressed and for any errors or omissions is, of course, mine.

As is well known, Hicks is, with Allen, the author of "A Reconsideration of the Theory of Value" (Hicks & Allen, 1934), which is of fundamental importance in the development of the theory of ordinal utility. For an overview of Hicks' background and earlier work, cfr. HEGS.