Agent-based modelling. History, essence, future

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In many areas of the social sciences, the technique of agent-based modelling (ABM) is gaining increasing popularity. For many researchers – in particular for those not specialized in computer simulation – this catchy term seems to provide a way between Scylla and Charybdis, between the arcane dream worlds of mainstream, general equilibrium economists and the jungle of sociological singularities that leaves us in a forest of contradictory case studies. Of course, the former – due to their mathematical language and despite their mostly trivial content – are much harder to read; but the mass of the latter has the disadvantage of becoming ever more boring. The usage of an ABM implies the need for familiarity with the technique; the predominant approach to designing ABMs has largely been based on imitation. This has been the case in the last twenty years, and as could have been expected a large set of quite different types of software applications and corresponding customers emerged. Today, the exact scope of characteristics of ABM remains controversial.¹

This paper is an attempt to contribute to the understanding of this not-so-new approach. It starts with some historical landmarks in the emergence of agent-based modelling. While more comprehensive surveys of the history of ABM exist, this paper only focuses on those deemed to be of the greatest significance.

The first part of the paper provides a concise sketch of the essence of ABM for novices and those unsatisfied with many of the more restrictive definitions of the field. The section ends with a recipe for building an ABM. The second part discusses the future of ABM. It is organized along the lines of the three aspects of a language: syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic evolution. Naturally, it contains several speculative elements, and should thus be regarded as a collection of possible visions.

¹ E.g. compare the views of Nigel Gilbert (2008) and Chen and Wang (2010).

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1. History of ABM

Agent-based modelling is a fashionable new name for a particular use of computer simulations in economics, which has existed, in different forms, for almost as long as computers. In the fifties and sixties, large US universities installed computer centres to support researchers in the natural sciences; soon, economists were eager to transfer tedious calculations to the new machinery. Before that, large amounts of data as well as larger difference equation systems built on the then new analytical technique of input-output tables were using up a lot of intellectual effort that could now be delegated to computers. The advent of computer simulation can therefore be considered as the appearance of ‘the economist’s little helper’, the calculating machine.

Then came a shift of focus that was initiated by computer firms acting in an oligopoly, and that was quickly taken up by the scientific interpreters of the new machines. The growth of demand for computers generated by the military and other state institutions was starting to slow down; to revive sales in the “age of high mass consumption” (Rostow, 1960), the need for the production of smaller and more flexible devices became evident. Small firms and households did not need the extreme calculation power required by research in theoretical high-energy physics. What they would buy instead was a small machine that offered a large diversity of uses, from simple household accounting and writing letters to computer games for children and idle employees. In the early eighties, the personal computer was born, and the teaching of informatics in schools was introduced as an educational add-on. Scientists like Alan Newell and Herbert Simon quickly saw that with this diversity of uses offered by computers, the old calculator had become a “symbol manipulating device” (Newell and Simon, 1972). Indeed, whatever one can consider as a symbol can easily be translated in a bit stream and can then be manipulated in many more ways than just adding and subtracting. At that time another fashionable term was invented to attract research money: ‘artificial intelligence’. Its success was built on the surprise of computer illiterates about the speed of machines searching in

\[\text{2} \text{ Quite to the contrary, it is somewhat complicated to perform adding with the processes most elementary to computers, e.g. ‘copying’ (compare Hanappi, 1992).}\]
databases. For the general public this looked ‘intelligent’, though it had little to do with the traditional meaning of the word. In short, intelligence is the capacity to graft an internal model, an interpretation, on an already screened perception by using analogies and pattern recognition. Finding items in large databases, of course, is part of this capacity but even solving mathematically well-defined problems does not really rely on this type of capacity. Even today, such a narrow understanding of ‘artificial intelligence’ haunts software applications, including economic simulations.

The early fields of application naturally followed the divide of economics into microeconomics and macroeconomics. On the one hand, simple oligopolistic markets were mirrored, while on the other hand, early Keynesian macroeconomic models were simulated. Contrary to abstract general form models, these new models first had to be econometrically estimated to fill in parameter values into the behavioural equations. Without using the word ‘agent’, such a behavioural equation already was meant to capture the behaviour of economic entities, or economic agents. In microeconomics those were firms, households, or individuals; in macroeconomics, they were more abstract aggregates of ‘all households’ (e.g. consumption function), ‘all firms’ (e.g. investment function), or ‘several state institutions’ (e.g. tax function). With the increasing technical abilities of hardware and software, soon economists attempted to combine micro- and macroeconomic computer simulations, a task reflecting the more conventional efforts of mainstream economic theory to provide a microfoundation for macroeconomics. In the late eighties, it became more or less evident that the latter task had failed since it needed very implausible restrictions on the micro-level to allow for aggregation at all. Moreover, the convenient method of considering only stable equilibria, or equilibrium paths, became less and less useful in a world that was governed by amplifying disequilibria, e.g. in the labour market. But the human capital stock of academic economists built up by this type of research was already too large to be easily given away. The alternative to use computer simulations would have needed too

\[3\text{ See Hanappi and Egger (1993) for some thoughts on artificial intelligence.}\]
much investment in learning the new techniques for the established community; thus it became a territory for mavericks only.

Outside standard economic theory, economic simulation got a first boost from a completely different side. In biology, mathematical modelling and in particular game theory models began to be applied with increasing success (Smith, 1982). Darwin’s idea of evolutionary dynamics was simulated by computer programs and the results were compared to the developments in actual biological populations. This inspired two economists, Sidney Winter and Richard Nelson, to use computer simulation to mirror market dynamics. Their ‘animals’ were firms, and instead of by Darwinian traits, they were characterized by a set of ‘routines’ they used. Then, a simulation of market dynamics was used to study how the worst ‘routines’ were weeded out by some kind of ‘survival of the fittest’. This type of dynamic of economic processes never coming to rest in an equilibrium had been described by Joseph Schumpeter 70 years earlier (Schumpeter, 1911). Richard Nelson is a famous representative of standard microeconomics and worked for the inclusion of Schumpeterian thought in economic theory.

With their book, which they called *An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change*, Nelson and Winter started an economic school of the same name, evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982). It still relies heavily on the techniques of computer simulation, today under the label of agent-based simulation. It is remarkable that with this type of methodological approach the meso-level, situated between traditional micro- and macro-level topics, can emerge as a decisively important element of political economy. This attracted scholars specialising in institutionalism to join evolutionary economics: the evolution from one relatively stable stage of a simulated world to its next stage, from their perspective, represents the evolution of institutions.⁶

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⁴ For an epistemological support of this argument compare Lehtinen and Kuorikoski (2007).
⁵ The Scottish economist Brian Arthur, the modeller of the famous "Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationality. The El Farol Bar Problem", is such a case (Arthur, 1994).
⁶ There still is no consensus on what the concept of institution should describe. Its meaning in the literature ranges from any systematic behaviour of any social entity, to an empirically observable organisation, more or less fixed by contracts.
A whole group of scientists then tried to find new foundations for the social sciences with the help of computer sciences. The ‘New Foundations’ movement spread out over a wide disciplinary range, starting on the more formal end already in 1959 with Stephen Wolfram’s “A New Kind of Science” and reaching the most prestigious research journal of economists, the *American Economic Review*, where Robert Axtell and Joshua Epstein published an article on “Artificial Life” (Wolfram, 2002; Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Geanakoplos et al., 2012). Models of the artificial life variety usually had homogenous small agents that resembled ant colonies: they commanded only very few instruments (e.g. moving and eating) and very few goals (e.g. food consumption), but a huge number of them (e.g. ten thousand) were positioned on a common landscape and the simulation then started. The expected result was a specific, reproducible pattern of aggregate outcome of the enormous amount of interactions on the micro-level. These artificial ant colonies still followed the quest to derive emerging patterns on the macro-level from the simple, archaic behaviour of micro-agents – now with the help of simulations. Fundamentally this was the old research program of methodological individualism now dressed up as the more popular “artificial life”. To break this spell, ABM had to move on to heterogeneous agents and the ability of their internal models to allow for more sophisticated forecasts. Only then communication processes could bring about some countervailing macro-foundation of micro-behaviour, and finally the more adequate possibility to dissolve the unhealthy opposition between micro and macro in a simulation with full interaction between all levels.

The second important external boost to economic theory building that was almost completely ignored by mainstream economists came from the study of complex systems with the help of network theory. Its roots can be traced back to the scientific revolution in theoretical physics that led to the development of quantum theory. With this new knowledge of the basic rules that govern physical processes at the smallest scale, the validity of the older Newtonian mechanics could be

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7 An intermediate step was to construct computer simulations of the interaction of macroeconomic agents (compare Hanappi, 1995). The next logical step then is to open up the “black boxes” of lower level agents and turn them into simulated “white boxes” in the sense of Norbert Wiener, see Hanappi and Hanappi-Egger (1999).

8 See also Mario Bunge’s concept of “systemism” (Bunge, 2000).
understood as a special case. It can describe behaviour if one looks at statistical averages occurring when an enormous mass of small units is interacting. The mathematician and physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who gave this theory the analytical waveform, arguing from this new perspective in 1943 asked a surprising old question: “What is Life?” This took the natural sciences to the next level. The old atomism of ancient Greek philosophy had assumed a mass of homogenous atoms; the new quantum theory has discovered a diversity of ever smaller heterogeneous particles interacting in unexpected ways. Asking how these processes could be formally described stretched our analytical capabilities to their limits.10

Applying the new finite diversity ideas to the human species meant departing from the image of a unique homo oeconomicus. Even with the old analytical apparatus of mathematics, heterogeneity could be envisaged.11 The transdisciplinary genius John von Neumann, who after a discussion with the prominent economist Nicolas Kaldor produced an elegant economic growth model, realized that a deep change in formalisation techniques was inevitable. To support new analytical techniques, he revived the old concepts of Charles Babbage and Ada Lovelace, and together with some outstanding US engineers invented the modern computer. As it turned out, this device was able to accommodate heterogeneity to a previously unimaginable extent. In a daring attempt to imagine the future abilities of this “new combination” of theory and technical support – note the importance of Schumpeter’s characterisation of innovation – Doyne Farmer and Aletta Belin early on tried to grasp its implications.12

\(^9\) See Schrödinger (1944).
\(^10\) In an attempt to describe network evolution as a learning process, Stuart Kaufmann started applying Boolean networks early on too, see Kauffman (1993). The idea to use networks seemed to be in the air and quickly led to the emergence of the so-called Complexity. It turned out to be at the centre of the research program of the most creative research institute in the field, the Santa Fe Institute. This institute was also the place where the agent-based modelling simulation package SWARM was developed and applied by Robert Langton and his team. In a sense, the worldwide success story of ABM started there. A most influential early seminal paper was contributed there by Richard Palmer, Brian Arthur, John Holland, B. LeBaron, and P. Tayler (Palmer et al., 1994).
\(^12\) See Farmer and Belin (1990).
Then, in 1944, John von Neumann even proposed to invent a new mathematical language for social processes\textsuperscript{13} – game theory.\textsuperscript{14} It took 40 years until his idea reached the field of biology, when John Maynard Smith successfully applied it to animal systems. Already in 1963, however, a researcher in the area of weather forecasting, Edward Lorenz, played around the parameters of simple dynamic systems and discovered that these deterministic systems were able to produce time series that could not be distinguished from random series, e.g. from white noise (Lorenz, 1963). The methodological impact was significant: once a historical time series is given that resembles an economic law heavily disturbed by exogenous shocks, it might as well be completely deterministic. A new set of methods to deal with that question had to be developed; moreover, since the probability of these “deterministic chaos systems” increases with the size of the system, it became evident that the use of simulation methods was necessary.

Strict mathematical arguments often start by assuming two opposite extreme situations. In the case of many endogenous variables, one extreme can easily be fixed: assume that everything depends on everything. An opposite extreme would be that the dynamics allows to derive the second variable from the first only, the third from the second only, and so on, until the first variable then depends on the last only. The Hungarian mathematician Paul Erdös saw that these two extremes have a geometrical representation as graphs, where the nodes are variables and the links are dynamic equations. While the first extreme thus displayed a graph with direct links between all nodes, the second extreme is a ring with two links at each node only. Erdös’ innovation was to assume that links might sequentially emerge between variables, following a random process that can be described by well-known stochastic processes. Erdös’ Random Graph Theory was just the beginning of a boom in network theories. In the nineties, Laszlo Barabasi and his team discovered that in a surprising number of living systems a special structure could be

\textsuperscript{13} von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, p. 6) write: “[t]he importance of the social phenomena, the wealth and multiplicity of their manifestations, and the complexity of their structure, are at least equal to those in physics. It is therefore to be expected – or feared – that mathematical discoveries of a stature comparable to that of calculus will be needed in order to produce decisive success in this field.”

\textsuperscript{14} See Hanappi (2013).
found empirically – they followed a scale-free distribution and their networks had a so-called “small world” structure.\\(^{15}\)

The study of how a sequence of link emergences that can be algorithmically specified, leading to such an empirical structure, has become since then a vivid field of research. One such procedure is built on the assumption of “preferential attachment”, i.e. the probability of a node to be part of the next link that enters the network is proportional to the number of links that it already has. It is evident that nodes could also be interpreted as agents, and this is exactly what is assumed in so-called “games played on networks”. Strategic decisions of agents using their internal models of other agents (in the sense of Neumann’s game theory) then lead to actions, which are the links between nodes.\\(^{16}\) It is clear that the size and content of internal models as well as the number of links that an agent can perceive and deal with are crucial. The limits of these modelling elements determine how adequately a network can mirror an object of investigation.

The agent-based models developed in the last decade, therefore, reflect innovative developments in sciences and provide a transdisciplinary focus.\\(^{17}\) We must also note that, due to the global financial crisis in 2008, the object of investigation studied by ABM experienced a slight shift. While before the crisis many models were investigating interactions within financial markets, mainly focussing on the behaviour of traders, after the crisis, the implications that a potential financial collapse could have on the national and eventually on the global economy became the preferred subjects. One of the first large projects that addressed this question was “Eurace” (www.eurace.org), which incorporated much of the standard macroeconomic behavioural functions in an ABM framework.\\(^{18}\)

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\\(^{15}\) Compare Barabasi (2014); Watts (1999).
\\(^{16}\) Note that actions can either be in the world of information, i.e. communication, or physical processes outside language.
\\(^{17}\) Compare Hanappi (2014) for an embedding of the new approach in the history of traditional economic modelling.
\\(^{18}\) Other important contributions showing how ABM can follow the focus of economic policy attention are Dosi et al. (2010) and Hongyan and Tesfatsion (2009).
2. Essential features of ABM

The basic idea of ABM is that agents, living entities using internal model-building, are mimicked by computer programs.\(^{19}\) The immediate consequences of this starting point are that:

a) an agent’s structure has to be described by a program that is sophisticated enough to allow for the sequence: (i) perception, (ii) embedding in an internal model, (iii) choice of an action (including the action ‘communicate’);

b) agents and the programs representing them will typically be different, i.e. the standard case of ABM will typically be heterogeneous ABM;

c) there has to be a main program, which is not an agent, and which provides a description of the environment in which the agents can perceive and influence this environmental dynamics through their actions.

By disentangling the material world outside the internal consciousness of an agent from what goes on within its internal information processing, ABM can describe model-driven behaviour of agents that use models that differ markedly from the actual dynamics of their environment. The most important task in this respect is to explore the selection of what is observed, how it is embedded in an internal model, and how finally actions are recognized and chosen, and how this whole process develops over time. Again, it must be emphasized that for each agent this perpetually repeated process can and will be different – though they, of course, can resemble each other in some aspects.\(^{20}\)

The scientist constructing an agent-based model has to know a lot about the empirically observed agents that shall be described by the ABM. Contrary to most of mainstream economic model building, ABM does not require the simplification of agent behaviour according to the

\(^{19}\) It is clear that at the current stage of development of ABM, several competing preliminary definitions exist. One of them is provided in this paper, a well-known alternative can be found in Tesfatsion (2017).

\(^{20}\) Thus using object-oriented programming slang, the similarities can be expressed as making them instances of the same “class” – at least as long as some essential differences between these instances can be formulated.
technical requirements of analytical methods. In particular, the assumptions that some processes can be ignored because they are so fast that it is sufficient to include only the result of their convergence, in the form of equilibrium equations, are superfluous. There is also not the same need to simplify matters by assuming that the heterogeneity of agents shall be ignored and a common representative type of agent, the *homo oeconomicus* or the “representative firm”, is good enough for an adequate picture of reality. Moreover, the somewhat metaphysical assumption that agents are born with innate preference orders – which in more advanced versions of mainstream economic models might allow for slow modification – that guide their choice of instrument variables, this ‘heroic’ assumption can be replaced by an answer to the underlying question: where do incentives for actions come from? The answer of ABM is less simple. Incentives are a mixture of signals sent directly from the body of the agent (e.g. feeling hungry, low revenues, political instability, etc.), and of the interpretation of perceptions with the help of the internal model that produces indirect signals.

Perception thus means that impressions are routed to the internal model that structures them into a vector of need levels. With the increased influence of internal models, the focus on communication processes, i.e. the exchange of models between agents, is strengthened.

The shift of methodology also concerns the choice of the scope of models. When after the marginalist turn of economic theory initiated by Walras, Menger, and Jevons in 1874, mathematical methods started to dominate economics, it seemed to be immediately evident that (following theoretical physics) one had to start with the smallest and easiest unit to model economic dynamics. This unit was assumed to be the physical human individual and the approach was labelled methodological individualism. Later, with the inclusion of micro-units of the production sphere that conceptually were socially neutralized (being called “firms” rather than “firm owners”), the entire discipline was dubbed microeconomics. Though the mathematical model for a single unit was strikingly simple, copying natural science formalisms and adding some psychological hypotheses seemed good enough, it proved to be much more difficult to combine them to derive a kind of aggregate ‘social thermodynamics’. From Léon Walras to the Arrow-
Hahn model of 1967, this effort proved to be manageable only with an increasing amount of implausible additional assumptions. Keynes’s work in the interwar period had been the theoretical answer to the impotence of marginalist theory in the face of the Great Depression of the ‘30s. Marginalism simply could not explain how such self-amplifying disequilibria in all markets can happen, and therefore it could not propose any remedies. Keynes’ success was thus built on the methodological innovation to bring aggregates back into the picture that constituted economics.

Aggregates, like the total consumption of a nation or the total labour demand of all firms of a nation, were combined in an accounting framework mirroring national aggregates, this is the essence of macroeconomics. Of course, this accounting framework nevertheless needs agents that drive it. On the one hand, these ‘aggregate agents’ were constructed using socio-psychological constants characterising average microeconomic behaviour, e.g. a propensity of individuals to consume or a propensity of firms to invest; on the other hand, some aggregates important for national accounting asked for the re-introduction of an agent that was neglected in marginalism: the state. With this latter methodological innovation, a second improvement of standard theory was possible. The exogenously determined agent ‘state’ could be used to prescribe remedies for the apparent, welfare-decreasing disequilibria. But the methodological gap between marginalist microeconomics and Keynes’ macroeconomics could hardly be deeper. While the former claimed that general equilibrium ruled in the long-run and re-established itself quickly if non-economic events disturbed it, the latter focussed on the short-run and emphasized the need of state intervention, of an exogenously added political agent necessary to stabilize capitalism, to fight self-amplifying, endogenous disequilibrium processes.

The restriction caused by the need to consider only the short-run was due to the obvious variations of the aggregate agents’ socio-psychological ‘constants’ across different nations and across time. The disparate methodology between micro- and macroeconomics produced different sets of mathematical toolboxes used by the two sub-disciplines. While microeconomics still followed calculus as it was

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developed for physics by Isaac Newton, substituting ‘economic principles of man’ for the laws of physics, macroeconomics typically fell prey to the use of simple linear models developed by early followers of Keynes.

This inconsistency of methodology was a challenge for mathematically inclined economists like Paul Samuelson. His so-called “neo-classical synthesis” – a dramatic misnomer – aimed at providing a set of mathematical links smoothening the jump from microeconomics to macroeconomics. In retrospect, these efforts were not too successful. Most of them needed even stronger restrictions on the functional forms to be used and ever more implausible assumptions on the expectation processes performed by microeconomic units.22 With the focus on economics (which in the meantime had become microeconomics plus macroeconomics) shifting to questions of consistency and losing any responsibility for being adequate with respect to the world outside of their models, the scope of the science was redefined. It became dominated by mathematical requirements of elegance and solvability, i.e. the syntax of the formal apparatus.

Computers developed parallel to these changes in economic methodology. First, they were used in many rather profane domains, like administrative accounting procedures or calculating gunfire directions on warships. In the mathematical economics of the after-war period, they made an appearance as little helpers for problems still formulated by standard mathematical modelling of the type described above, in particular providing approximations in some econometric areas. But in the late ‘60s, proper simulation models of economic interactions finally began to emerge. Their goal rarely was to check consistency, or to provide the simplest ‘heroic’ assumption that still can be solved analytically; they typically tried to come as close as possible to the actual dynamics of the physical economic process. Such process they tried to imitate, i.e. the process outside the domain of their own language, the singular process in the material, physical world. In short, instead of being syntax-driven, they were semantics-driven.

22 An outstanding example is the rational expectations hypothesis, compare Sargent (1979).
The scope of ABM, therefore, relies on the observation of specific economic processes that can be well enough covered by observations, and can be well enough isolated from their respective environment. Whenever these requirements are met, the algorithmic language is almost unrestricted in its ability to mimic scientifically suggested essential dynamics. It is not syntax that drives this process, but the attention that the scientific community of ABM modellers gives to events happening outside the world of the language they use. It is thus this scope that makes ABM particularly interesting for practical questions coming from economic policy or any other field. Unfortunately, there also is a downside of this astonishing flexibility implicitly included in the scope of ABM: once an object of investigation is chosen and its essential features are pinned down by the model builder, there is no way to prove that simulation runs provide semantically correct results. In a sense, an ABM is just another way to tell the model builder’s story in a different language; it is formal story telling producing narratives.\(^{23}\) The critique that multiple, partially contradicting narratives of the same object of investigation can exist therefore also applies to agent based models.

Nevertheless, it is possible to compare the relative adequacy of different agent-based models. The standard procedures to do so can be borrowed from econometrics, applied to a comparison between simulation runs and observed data in an ex-post simulation. So there is no ‘everything goes’ freedom of different models but a ‘something is more adequate than something else’, which governs progress in ABM.

Finally, the phenomenon of \textit{emergence} of patterns of aggregate behaviour is often mentioned as a particular feature of agent-based modelling, and deserves some attention. Here there is a deep issue at stake. Finding a pattern in observations of repeated behaviour lies at the heart of every cognitive process; it is a major building block of the internal model-building of all living systems and indeed – applied to the agent’s own history – constitutes self-consciousness.\(^{24}\)

\(^{23}\) If formalization is syntax driven, it is always possible to check if a theorem is syntactically true or false. But here the disadvantage is that the distance to the object of investigation can easily produce the illusion that the derived truth concerns areas outside the language.

\(^{24}\) The newly emerging scientific field of quantum biology already provides interesting insights in this process, compare Al-Khalili and McFadden (2014, pp. 231-264).
In the first instance, pattern recognition clearly is not an act that takes place in the solitude of an individual member of a species. Thanks to Charles Darwin (1859) we know that knowledge can be accumulated in a species by evolutionary processes that work through a combination of (slightly disturbed, i.e. mutated) copying of behavioural traits and weeding out of some of them by forces of the environment. The agent, which is the subject of the pattern recognition process of knowledge accumulation, is therefore the species, at least from a biological perspective. A special property of the human species – for many scientists its characteristic property – is the ability to distribute the knowledge of the species across its members. This process needs several preconditions. First, individuals need a brain that allows to communicate, i.e. to translate physical processes into symbol systems that can be stored, reactivated and re-translated into physical utterances. Second, there must be a physical medium of exchange between individuals that carries the symbols, transports them from one brain to the next. This could be air for voices, papyrus for written text, etc. Besides several other preconditions for the somewhat illusionary impression of individual pattern recognition, it also needs a special catalyst, called ‘recursion’, to initiate the particular human process. Recursion means that a sequence of copies, each one called by its predecessor, can produce the experience of time. More precisely, this primal experience is the contradiction between the constancy of re-appearing copies and a permanently changing environment. With this feature, knowledge accumulation in human societies in principle is freed from learning appropriate behavioural answers to changing environments the hard way: it is not necessary that the part of the population that acts inappropriately dies, to allow for the survival of the fittest. The French Enlightenment had already anticipated and proclaimed this goal when Darwin worked on its biological roots.

Some two hundred years earlier, René Descartes (1637) had specified some rules for the scientific method that the part of society specialized in discovering the patterns that govern the world, the scientists, should use. For him, the task to discover scientific laws had to start with the observation of a problem at an aggregate level, and then proceed by taking the big question apart in smaller problems that can be solved easier. According to Descartes, this is the essence of
analysis in its original sense. What emerge in the end of this process are the atoms, which, once revealed, provide the emergence of their synthesis. This is what Descartes calls the scientific method. The parallelism to the actual discoveries of the natural sciences of his time is evident. Analytical investigation of ever smaller sub-problems necessarily involves an increasing amount of division of labour between different sub-disciplines, and this clearly makes the moment of synthesis, of the emergence of an overarching understanding of a larger phenomenon, more difficult and demanding. It simply will happen less often. Today, we command an overwhelming amount of highly specialized knowledge in a similarly overwhelming diversity of different sub-disciplines. The latent force of synthesizing this knowledge is enormous, but the intellectual capacity needed to do so, to transfer it from latent knowledge of the species to a manifest emergence, is enormous as well.

The technique of agent-based modelling presents the possibility to invert Descartes’ traditional methodology. The scientist starts with a set of simply modelled micro-agents and works bottom-up by letting them interact on what is called an (interaction) landscape. Since this interaction is just computer simulation, it is easy to experiment with different sets of axiomatic micro-agents. Eventually, aggregate results of these interactions can produce simple patterns in aggregated variables that may even surprise the scientist. This is the moment of “emergence” of knowledge for ABM research – at least according to the advocates of this argument. The argument certainly touches on an important methodological point but still falls short of its force as long as it neglects the following consideration: assumptions on micro-agents that play the role of axioms from which the aggregate patterns are derived need not – and indeed never should – be the end of ABM research. A first step in the bottom-up process is just the starting point.

In that sense, the early agent-based modellers considered their work as a complementary approach to Jay Forrester’s famous top-down model that counts as the prototype of what, somewhat misleadingly, is called the “system dynamics approach”, see Forrester (1973; 1989) and Neal (2016). Like macroeconomic and microeconomic models that ignore the interdependence between the two perspectives, such a division into top-down system dynamics and bottom-up ABM today is completely inadequate: not only because the object of investigation forbids such a division, but also because modelling techniques today allow for their union.

Compare e.g. Roos (2016).
for deriving better assumptions on a modified set of heterogeneous micro-agents, and a consecutive simulation run. ABM research is a never-ending cycle of repetitive, adapted derivations alternating between running bottom-up and running top-down.

This oscillating movement supports the formalization of three extremely important elements of political economy: *expectations*, *power*, and *institutions*. On the way from the bottom upwards, micro-agents use internal models that include expected future values of variables that emerge on the top-level only, e.g. unemployment rates, inflation rates, budget deficits. This process links the two levels from below. On the other hand, political power on the top level restricts the action space of the micro-agents and thus acts as a link from above. Power can be exerted in two forms: either as directly coercive physical power, or as information-power that distorts the expectation process of micro-agents. If social reproduction is taking place over a longer time-period, this interplay between the two levels resembles a repeated strategic game played by the scientific community of ABM researchers. To solve the conflict between the opposing forces of expectation modelling and power modelling, certain conventions will develop instituted views on what to assume. A typical auxiliary mediator in models of market mechanisms would be an auctioneer managing a tâtonnement process. A more refined example would be a social partnership oriented state committee guiding the development of wage structures. It is typical for the channelling of conflicts into institutions to cause these institutions over time to become new intermediate levels between the micro-agents and the top-level political entity. Computer simulation, of course, can and should mimic all essential intermediate levels, i.e. institutions, which are run through by the oscillatory process.

Creating models for the interaction between expectation-building of agents, exertion of power by higher-level agents, and the resulting institutional solutions of conflicts therefor mirrors what goes on within the methodological process of ABM itself. It leads the researcher directly into the dynamics of its object of investigation. This indeed is a particular strength of agent-based modelling. Note that from this perspective a sudden emergence of knowledge does not only happen when a one-shot bottom up modelling is reaching the
aggregate view, rather, emergence of knowledge can happen at all levels and at any time of the repetitive modelling process.

Although from this point of view knowledge accumulation as the central project of the human species is unlimited, a single ABM research project always has a finite time horizon. Computer programs representing agents can as easily be equipped with finite expectation horizons, shortened memory capacities, and finite anticipation depth in game-theoretic settings, just as the modelling scientist can and will regulate the effort spent on the different details of the project, given a hard deadline for project completion.

It thus makes sense to provide a short recipe on how to cook an exemplary heterogeneous agent-based model.\textsuperscript{27}

Step 1: \textit{Choose a topic} that is closed enough with respect to its environment to allow for an independent consideration of its internal dynamics. There will be links between the topic and its environment but the force from outside, from exogenous variables into the model, should be much stronger than the influence of the model on its environment. This can be difficult in the beginning, if too many things seem to be fully interdependent. The art of the scientist consists to a large extent in the choice of neglecting less important elements and keeping the essential ones. Additionally, the time frame of the model has to be fixed (see above). The result of step 1 is the scope of the model.

Step 2: \textit{Identify the major agents} in your model. Agents at every level within the scope of the model can be considered. Each agent has at least one goal variable and at least one instrument variable, which define its embedding within the model. The set of variables of the ABM therefore consists of four types of variables: goal variables, instrument variables, auxiliary variables, and exogenous variables. The first three types are called endogenous variables; auxiliary variables are all those variables that help formulating relationships either in material processes or in internal models and which are neither goals nor instruments. The result of step 2 are two linked lists, one with agents and one with all variables.

Step 3: \textit{Construct the internal models} of the agents. A minimal internal model of an agent has to consist of a suggested relationship

\textsuperscript{27} Again, it is clear that this is just one of the currently existing cooking books for ABM. For a survey see Gräbner (2017).
between its single instrument and its single goal variable. Of course, most mental models are more sophisticated and include conflicting goals, multiple instruments, and auxiliary variables. At this stage, a close inspection of the empirically observed physical agent is mandatory, leading almost necessarily to a heterogeneous set of agents. An important part of this step it suggesting which variables the agent perceives and in which way they are perceived and used in the internal model. A central part of perception concerns information coming from other agents, i.e. the endogenous instrument variables (communication elements\textsuperscript{28}) set by other agents. The result of step 3 is a non-quantified logical blueprint of the model that contains all agents, all variables, and links showing which ones are related.

Step 4: Empirical data for all used variables has to be found. Since important parts of ABM concern internal model building processes that are rarely covered by official statistics, this can be a tedious task; in some cases, some crude assumptions will be the only possibility. The result of step 4 is a table with historically observed values of all variables.

Step 5: Econometric estimation and calibration of the suggested relationships. The quality of these estimations will vary according to the quality of the available data. In extreme cases, just guesses of some parameters will have to be used. The result is a quantitatively specified blueprint of the ABM.

Step 6: Software implementation of the model. There is a broad range of simulation tools, from the use of procedural computer languages to highly specialized simulation packages. Since the first implementation of a new model is usually considered as a preliminary toy model that can be iteratively used to improve steps 1 to 6, it is very important that this model can be easily handled; the use of modules might be particularly helpful. A simple software tool with some graphic capabilities therefore should be the result of step 6.

Step 7: Systematic results generation by a large number of steadily improved simulation runs. Since the repeated improvement process of step 1 to step 6 has to eventually reach an end – either because

\textsuperscript{28} A communication element can be a whole model that an agent posts in the hope to influence the actions of other agents in a way that furthers his or her own goal achievement.
improvements are becoming arbitrarily small, or because the deadline of the research project is approaching – some time before this endpoint, the overall emerged new knowledge has to be collected, interpreted, and condensed in a report.

3. Future perspectives of ABM

The perspectives of ABM will be discussed here along three dimensions: syntax, semantics, and pragmatics.

The syntax of ABM can still benefit from some substantial structural improvements, not to speak of standardisation. The variety of software support of ABM will certainly persist in the future, and this is to be welcomed. Nevertheless, some particularly important features will be identified (e.g. support graphic capabilities), while others will peter out (e.g. too rigid syntactical restrictions). One important improvement will concern reproducibility of results of simulation runs: the same ABM implemented with different software shall produce the same simulation results. As a precondition for this future task, transparency of what happens inside software packages is an immediate imperative.

A more daring goal is the development of a new arrangement of the set of operations that are in the action set of agents. Assigning values to variables and copying/imitating are certainly operations at least as basic as adding and subtracting. Moreover, actions in the area of perception, which to a large extent rely on pattern recognition combining external sensors with memory, will experience some special treatment as fundamental elements of syntax. Even more challenging is the type of behaviour observed in real cognitive processes that performs the switch between a seemingly stable background and movements in its forefront. If a sensitivity border is

29 Since the times of SWARM, software development has been tremendous with respect to the amount of the available packages, though rather modest with respect to their fundamental capabilities. Currently, the most popular packages include Anylogic, Repast, NetLogo, and Python; for system dynamics, a survey can be found at https://dsweb.siam.org/Software. But in principle ABM can be done in every programming language.

30 Compare Axtell et al. (1996).
reached, sometimes it may be just the feeling of being bored, then the agent may take as stable the moving foreground and may redirect her focus to the dynamics of the background. This switch in the mode of perception occurs more often than commonly understood and adds a new dimension to perceptions. At the moment, there exists no syntax element to support it in ABM.\(^\text{31}\)

The future challenges of the semantics of ABM are straightforward extensions of the characteristics described in the previous part of this paper. The semantic relations are the links between language elements and the elements outside language to which they refer. In the future, ABM, the language, will probably change along the lines of its object of investigation. Since, as explained above, the scope of its application is adjusted to a well-defined object, better ABM will mean that there will be a diversity of tailored languages for different areas. An evolutionary economics approach asking for the simultaneous treatment of micro-, meso-, and macro-processes will be supported by a very special type of ABM. In another area dealing with communication processes, the features of ABM that concern manipulations of internal models will be particularly fit to support ideas of learning and manipulating across agents. In a third example, market processes of information commodities with high fixed cost and zero variable cost can be supported with software allowing for more sophisticated arrangements of public-private production and more refined preference modelling – fashion effects and communication are essential. This broadening of ABM language into different jargons may seem like a counter-movement to the streamlining effects of syntactic innovations. But how far this diversification produces feedbacks on syntax innovation on a higher ground, both working in the same direction, remains an open question.

It is evident that an argument analogous to domain specification can be made with respect to agent specification. For agents, specific forms of perception could be the starting point, or characteristic sets of instrument variables. Another dimension along which the object of investigation of ABM could frame its form will be the respective

\(^{31}\) In everyday language this process is typically reflected as an exchange of the roles of verb and noun, or of adjective and noun; a procedure typical for the dialectical texts of the German philosopher Hegel.
environment that surrounds it. Modelling agents acting within a market regulated environment will look different form modelling a free-wheeling bargaining process outside market institutions. In all these cases, innovations of the ABM language will come from a close inspection of its respective object of investigation.

The most interesting future prospects of ABM become visible if one looks at the pragmatic aspect. In their simplest form, future agent-based models can be used as extensions of the 'brain' of an agent, the researching social entity. Anticipation of future interactions between multiple agents, e.g. as modelled in game theory, easily go beyond the information processing capabilities of the concerned social entity. In that case an appropriate ABM can help.

Consider another pragmatic example encountered by many scientific approaches, the conflict between actions optimizing short run goals and those being necessary for long run goal achievement. Information processing constrains usually make it more difficult to anticipate long run implications than advantages in the short run. With the help of ABM, an old goal of enlightenment can be realized. Decisions that in the short run appear as sacrifice, can be made incentive-compatible because long run implications are better understood. ABM is particularly apt to deal with different time horizons, since the use of agent-specific programs running in physical time on a computer forces the programmer to make the choice of respective time horizons (actual and as individually experienced by the modelled agents) explicit. The conflict between short run and long run clearly concerns the whole area of global environmental questions. In many cases, short run profit maximization of micro-units, e.g. firms, contradicts the long run survival of the landscape within which they operate.

This idea leads straight into the most interesting pragmatic aspect of agent-based modelling, the study for intervention into large-scale social evolution. It is the limited extent of landscapes, the predictable borderlines of possible extensions, of extensive growth, of globalisation, which necessitates considerations of deep re-structuring of prevailing dynamics.\textsuperscript{32} Since dynamic forces in the mixture of national and continental human populations are driven not

\textsuperscript{32} Compare Hanappi (2016).
only by the respective governance systems – the different ruling classes – but are also characterized by the spread of culture-specific internal mental models that form partially contradicting class forces, it becomes mandatory to gain some insight into this highly complicated process with the help of ABM; hopefully this will be possible in the future. The build-up and vanishing of classes on a national as well as on a global level requires a scientific investigation combining the study of economic, political and ideological (mental model oriented) forces.

By and large, an overall welfare increase that also avoids exploding inequality and is to take place in a limited environment can only emerge if the rules of interaction between the different parts of human society that were tailored to conditions prevailing 200 years ago are changed. There probably are only a handful of feasible new combinations, of new rule sets, i.e. global/local democracy mechanisms, new information sphere governance, modes of organization of production, which could be envisaged. To produce visions of them, to detect them, and to find ways to transform the current setting to the most preferable vision is certainly the most ambitious, but also the noblest goal to which agent-based models can contribute.

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