Unione Monetaria Europea: una guida vetero-keynesiana ai problemi



The work adopts an old Keynesian perspective to evaluate the EMU. Such a perspective raises concerns with the effectiveness of monetary policy, the feasibility of monetary policy, and the political economy of monetary policy. The EMU brings with it institutional lock-in, and therefore needs to be evaluated with a long term perspective. Whether or not to join the EMU depends on whether effective sovereign monetary policy is feasible now and in the future, whether the EMU constitutes an optimal currency area, and whether the proposed European Central Bank will have an appropriate institutional design. If formed, the EMU should create institutions which promote expansionary policies and empower the conduct of sovereign European monetary policy.



JEL Codes: E5, F3, F4, F02

Keywords: European monetary union, European central bank, optimal currency area, sovereign monetary policy.

Parole chiave

European monetary union, European central bank, optimal currency area, sovereign monetary policy.

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