La restrizione del credito in uno schema di teoria monetaria della produzione: il caso italiano

Guido Traficante, Guglielmo Forges Davanzati

Abstract


Questo articolo analizza le determinanti e gli effetti di una stretta creditizia in Italia, all’interno della teoria monetaria della produzione elaborata da Augusto Graziani. Sosteniamo che la restrizione creditizia, tra le altre cose, dipende da un declino nella domanda aggregata. Dal punto di vista empirico, ciò è mostrato per Italia, Francia e Germania. Tuttavia, si evidenzia che una stretta monetaria decisa dalla Banca Centrale Europea – quindi comune ai tre paesi – non induce una riduzione statisticamente significativa del credito in Italia. Questo risultato probabilmente è causato della scarsa sostituibilità del credito bancario come fonte di finanziamento, dato che la struttura produttiva italiana è prevalentemente caratterizzata da piccole e medie imprese.

This paper deals with the causes and the effects of a credit restriction in Italy, within the theoretical framework of the monetary theory of production, as elaborated by Augusto Graziani. It will be argued that credit restriction ultimately depends on the decline of aggregate demand. Empirically, this view is supported for Italy, France and Germany. However, a monetary policy tightening implemented by the European Central Bank does not lead to a significant credit reduction in Italy, probably due to the low degree of substitutability of bank financing, given that the Italian production structure is mainly characterized by small and medium enterprises.

JEL codes: E12, E51, E52

Keywords: monetary theory of production, credit restriction, aggregate demand

 


Parole chiave


monetary theory of production; credit restriction; aggregate demand

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3651_71.283_3

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Reg. Tribunale di Roma n.377/2009 del 19/11/2009