La comunicazione della Banca Centrale dei Caraibi Orientali: un’analisi testuale (On the communication of the Eastern Caribbeans Central Bank: A textual analysis)

Giacomo Caterini

Abstract


L’adesione ad un’unione monetaria e l’ancoraggio valutario rispetto a una divisa di riferimento possono risultare vantaggiosi per le economie più instabili e le cui istituzioni abbiano stentato, nel tempo, a godere di adeguata credibilità. La trasparenza dell’autorità monetaria e la capacità di veicolare chiaramente gli obiettivi di policy sono particolarmente rilevanti nei paesi emergenti: da ciò dipende la credibilità dell’istituzione e, quindi, l’efficacia delle politiche. Questo contributo analizza il ruolo che la trasparenza e la chiarezza delle comunicazioni ufficiali dell’Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) hanno nel formarne la credibilità agli occhi degli agenti economici e nel ridurre l’incertezza sulle politiche future. Sulla base delle comunicazioni ufficiali rilasciate dall’ECCB si stima l’indice di leggibilità Flesh-Kincaid, se ne osserva l’evoluzione nel tempo e si propongono diversi modelli econometrici volti a verificare l’ipotesi secondo cui una banca centrale chiara e credibile possa, mediante le proprie dichiarazioni, agevolare l’accumulazione di riserve in valuta estera che, in un regime di cambio ancorato al dollaro, costituiscono la principale prerogativa della stessa.

Joining a currency union and establishing a peg with a reference currency can enhance economic stability and institutional credibility of historically unstable economies. Central banks’ transparency and their ability to communicate policy objectives are particularly relevant in emerging countries: these aspects determine the credibility of monetary authorities and the efficacy of their strategies. This paper sheds light on the role that transparency and clarity of communications released by the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) have on shaping its credibility and on reducing uncertainty about future policies. Starting from official statements released by the ECCB, text mining tools are applied to estimate the Flesh-Kincaid readability index and to observe its evolutions over time. Several econometric models are estimated to investigate the negative relation between the accumulation of foreign assets retained by the ECCB and the complexity of its official statements. 

JEL codes: E00, C01, E40, E50


Parole chiave


Monetary Unions, Official Reserves, Communication

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3651_73.289_4

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