Winning the Peace: “Lost Treasure” of European Integration?

Introduction

The European Union (EU) approaches the next hurdle in its breathtaking obstacle course toward democracy: will the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe be ratified in 2006 given the uncertain outcome of some of the ten referendums planned so far? In order to elicit popular approval, the Constitution’s authors worked hard to list the common values, which define the EU’s collective identity. Europeans are “united in diversity”; the Union is founded on “values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law”. These values, however, are hardly unique to the EU; the United States of America, India and many other countries legitimately claim them also. What then makes up the European Union’s unique identity, beyond its transnational character? Might it not stem from the EU’s first stated “objective” in the Constitution, to “promote peace, its values”, that follows the Preamble’s open acknowledgment of “bitter experiences” and “former divisions”? Unfortunately nowhere is peace defined, and the Constitution is not a citizen-friendly handbook for its promotion.

In free political societies, debates on collective identity revolve around divergent interpretations of the common history. At fifty-five years of age, the EU has accumulated enough history for the conversation to start. But, as the German-American thinker Hannah Arendt notes, while the polis draws self-understanding from thinking through lived experience, too often this is a “lost treasure”. With disarming

(3) Those who possessed the treasure “found it so strange that they did not even know how to name it”. HANNAH ARENDT, Between Past and Future (New York, Penguin, 1993), 6.
candor, former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González writes of the Maastricht Treaty, which he helped negotiate: “Having completed the debate we baptized the creature ‘European Union’... We needed to define what the Union is, or no one would understand us... Finally we decided that the European Union is a union of peoples. Exhausted by the effort, we had to hush the questioning child because we were having difficulties finding the answer to the next question: what do we mean by a union of peoples?” (4). It is thus perhaps not surprising that Étienne Balibar describes the European Communities as “essentially the by-product, and part of the mechanism, of the Cold War” (5). This evaluation hardly reflects a scholarly consensus on European integration. But André Glucksman expresses a widely shared puzzlement regarding the Founding Father’s motivations who acted in deafening “silence” to build the new Europe on “tangible” foundations such as the productivity index, trade, and investment. Meanwhile, the new peace has yet to be thought through (6).

Franz C. Mayer and Jan Palmowski judiciously point out that the European historical memory has failed to develop, partly because “teaching on the history and structure of the EU in schools is paltry compared to the history and government of the nation” (7). The difficult debates around the ratification of the Constitution offer a unique opportunity to reflect on the European Union’s identity by discussing the political legacy of its collective history of peace-making, and this essay is a contribution to what could become an ongoing learning process. It proposes an Arendtian analysis of three principles of action that spurred Europeans to win the peace after WWII (instead of losing it as they did after 1918): reconciliation, power as action in concert and recognition of the other. If the considerations of Hannah Arendt - and also Charles Taylor - prove so relevant to this exercise in self-reflection, it is because actors and thinkers were looking for the same treasure: how to rebuild pluralistic, peaceful and participatory political societies without negating long-established identities, and they dared break out of old patterns (8).

(4) FELIPE GONZÁLEZ, European Union and Globalization, “Foreign Policy”, no. 115 (Summer 1999), 31.
(6) ANDRÉ GLUCKSMANN, Le Bien et le Mal. Lettres immorales d’Allemagne et de France (Paris, Robert Laffont, 1997), 32, 34 et 19. All citations from French texts are translated by the author, unless otherwise indicated.
(7) FRANZ C. MAYER and JAN PALMOWSKI, European Identities and the EU: The Ties that Bind the Peoples of Europe, “Journal of Common Market Studies”, Vol. 42, no. 3 (September 2004), 573-598), 580.
(8) According to Philippe De Schoutheete, emphasis on common action rather than a common culture shaped European integration and conditioned its success.
It must be stressed at the outset that the European principles of action must be understood as political, not as “moral absolutes” or Christian virtues. They are not causal; their outcomes are not predictable. Akin to Montesquieu’s principles, political principles are what move a constitutional regime to action. “They correspond to a sort of psychological mindset in the actors, not abstract, but extremely general, inspiring actions without prescribing them. They relate to the manner in which people...begin to act, the principium that establishes the principle of later action” (9). Arendt agrees with Montesquieu that decay threatens when a community forgets its principle(s); hence her passionate concern, during the fractious 1960s, for the “lost treasure of the American Revolution”, which she defined as the principles of “public freedom, public happiness, public spirit” (10). Like the American Revolution, the last fifty years of European integration can be thought of as a founding, although it did not occur all “at once” or “according to a single plan”. The 1950 Schuman Declaration that proposed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) mentions all three European principles. Reconciliation: “the age-old opposition of France and Germany” and “its sanguinary divisions” must be eliminated; power as action in concert: “the solidarity in production” (of coal and steel) and the creation of a new “High Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries” will be the key to future economic prosperity and security for Europe; recognition of the other: the “organization” is “open to the participation of the other countries of Europe” without distinction (11).

Arendt retrieved the “lost treasure of the American Revolution” in the speeches and deeds of the American founders, from the anonymous participants in the Town Hall meetings of New England to the Declaration of Independence’s author Thomas Jefferson. With a matchless appreciation for political actors, she described these “heroes” as the subjects of stories, which eventually form the “storybook


of mankind” (12). European integration has its own “heroes”; they include grass roots citizens as well as public personalities. Why not consult the rich storybook of European integration, the “speeches and deeds” of several generations of founders, their memoirs, autobiographies and interviews? Always in part self-justificatory acts, these documents provide nevertheless a precious entry point in the spirit that moved the project. The European principles, which the remainder of this essay outlines, albeit in an all too abbreviated form, should be understood as “tentative” (13). Again, like Montesquieu’s political principles, which marked the originality of each regime, they act like “hypotheses” in the open-ended discussion about the European Union’s identity (14).

Of course, ethical commitments by themselves do not explain political action and political outcomes, if anyone was foolhardy enough to assert such a proposition after Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault; and the exact nature of the interaction between idealistic and self-interested pursuits will remain a lively topic for debate in the field of European integration studies (15). But to identify European integration primarily as an economic and technocratic enterprise is to offer a truncated version of a very complex political tradition. In con-

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(14) **Isaiah Berlin, Against the Current** (New York, Viking, 1980), 138.

trast with Arendt, the European founders eschewed the distinction between economics and politics. They believed that economic interactions could create a public space where former enemies could learn to trust and begin to “act together”. The unwieldy Constitution reflects their complex goals, with its noble overtones in Part I and II on Fundamental Provisions and The Charter of Fundamental Rights, and its abscond and lengthy Policies in Part III.

1. - The principle of reconciliation

Reconciliation, so often invoked, sounds like the mantra of European rhetoric. Although it is sometimes traced back to the 1963 Elysee Treaty of friendship between France and the Federal Republic of Germany, it first manifested itself in the highly technical Treaty of Paris founding the ECSC a decade earlier. The Treaty came out of a “web” of human relationships, in which forgiving, breaking with the culture of blame, promising, a fair reorganization of the economic relations between the parties, and the benevolent involvement of an external political power together weaved the new. Arendt’s reflections on action and its palliatives provide rich theoretical resources to recast these founding European practices into the complex principle of reconciliation. Shocked by the ease with which “good” Germans had shed their Christian values under Nazi rule, Arendt stressed action rather than reconciliation.(16). But, with hard-headed-realism, she understood the unpredictable and irreversible consequences of human initiative. Unless individuals abandoned either “fanatical hatred” or the “complicity” imposed by the Nazis, they could not reach understanding among themselves(17). Therefore Arendt supported the European Resistance’s post-War II plans toward Germany, and later she proposed her own “remedies”, forgiving and promising, against the foolishness of human action. Forgiveness frees both wrong doers and victims from the prison of revenge with its “never ending cycle of action and reaction,” rescuing politics from stalemate or violence. It restores the ability to act anew, unconditioned by the past. With the faculty of promising, people stabilize the new beginning; they create “islands of certainty” which allow them to treat the future as if it were the present(18).

(18) For Arendt’s endorsement of the Resistance’s proposals on Germany; Essays in Understanding cit., 114-120. On forgiving and promising: ARENDT, The Hu-
Political promises are almost always written: “Laws and constitutions, treaties and alliances” (19). The Schuman Declaration surprised everyone by proposing a treaty with a program of economic and social development for the coal and steel industries and their workers, and common institutions. Some minimize the unusual character of this initiative, unconvincingly given the irreversible consequences of action: during the Occupation, the Germans extracted the equivalent of 48% of the French 1939 GNP in annual payments; 200,000 French men and women did not return from Germany after the war ended (20). Yet there is not one word of reproach in the Schuman Declaration, simply the acknowledgment that France’s twenty-year long effort to promote peace and a unified Europe did not succeed. And “we had war”. Indeed, forgiving and promising imply breaking with the culture of blame, which has justified the permanent exclusion of wrongdoers from new political communities. In 1940 after the German invasion of France, French catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain embarks on a lecture tour in the US to encourage American involvement in the war. With astonishing generosity, he rejects publicly the idea of a future dismemberment of Germany and calls for a federal Europe in which a democratic Germany would have its full part. Later concentration camp prisoners such as Leon Blum, Alitiero Spinelli, Simone Veil, and Jean Rey support similar proposals and so do nine European resistance movements in a manifesto published in 1944 from Geneva. Maritain acknowledges that the Treaty of Versailles and “the faults that followed” strengthened Germany’s “century old pathology” of demand and hegemony; in Pour l’Europe French Foreign Affairs minister Robert Schuman mentions Napoleon’s imperialistic wars, which in turn “aroused 19th c German imperialism” (21). Few French leaders endorsed these views, which did not negate German guilt and

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(19) ARENDT, On Revolution cit., 164.
responsibility for WWII. But they made it psychologically and politically feasible to include the perpetrator on equal footing in 1950. For his part, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer commits his government to a politics of reparations: between 1949 and 2000 the Federal Republic of Germany will pay $70 billion to war victims in Europe and the state of Israel(22). In his *Memoirs*, Adenauer openly urges Germans to “understand what has brought us so low”. He detects the roots of Nazism in an exaggerated respect for the authority of the state: Hitler came to power because all sectors and classes of German society shared in this pernicious political culture, not just a small elite of military men or business people(23).

Forgiveness is controversial both in theory and in real life. George Kateb critiques Arendt’s definition as too vague and all encompassing, “no one is entitled to forgive me for the wrong I have done except the person to whom I have done wrong”(24). Max Kohnstamm, the Dutch first Secretary-General of the ECSC, who was incarcerated by the Germans during WWII, states that, “To speak of forgiving the Germans in general is already the beginning of the Holocaust, a dangerous abstraction. Moreover to find the guilty ones is a complex task. It is absurd to speak only of the German sin; Europe was guilty. Few countries can be entirely proud of their attitude during that period”(25). For Noam J. Zohar, however, the interpersonal process of forgiveness can take place in international relations because “the State functions as a vehicle for action of a human collective”. Peter Digeser argues that if States can grant collective forgiveness, this would transform the nature of the international system, precisely the aim pursued by the founders of the ECSC(26).


(25) Max Kohnstamm interview by Maria Grazia Melchionni and Roberto Ducci, Brussels, September 27, 1984. Melchionni and Ducci conducted long interviews with 18 negotiators of the Treaties of Paris and Rome in 1984. These documents of oral history can be consulted at the Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe in Lausanne (FJM), Switzerland. From now on, these interviews will be identified by the name of the interviewee followed by FJM.

But it is important to note with Lily Gardner Feldman that, beside a “break with age-old national animosities”, successful reconciliation policies also rest on a “pragmatic” component, which includes programs of economic and political cooperation to serve State interests, “security and prosperity” (27). Kohnstamm stresses the “rational” aspect of the collaboration with the Germans: “At first, there was a very strong feeling of hate among the prisoners. But it did not last very long. No genius was required to understand that we could not rebuild Europe without the Germans. The Netherlands, a de facto economic province of Germany, needed German industry. But what was the meaning of German renaissance if bombs were again fabricated in the Ruhr and dropped on Rotterdam? How to break out of this vicious circle?” The Schuman Declaration struck him like “thunder” so convinced was he that “this was the answer to the vicious circle, which was not only economic, but also ethical” (28). Assessments of the economic benefits of the ECSC vary. Some call it a success because production and trade in coal and steel increased considerably among the six partners; others a failure because it did not succeed in dismantling the German steel cartel and in liberalizing trade in coal and steel fully. But scholars agree that even if “the ECSC actually delivered on only one of its promises”, it was “the most important one: it advanced the integration process” and “substituted for a peace treaty with Germany” (29). Moreover, by creating a public space where German and French actors could relate on equal terms, the treaty facilitated the resolution of the thorny issues of the Ruhr status and the French annexation of the Saar territory.

Winning the peace hinges on winning the war, yet it is a different project. International reconciliations frequently involve a benevolent external power (or hegemon), willing and able to guarantee the security of the parties. It may be argued that the US acted more like a guardian angel than a hegemon in 1947 when it offered the Marshall Plan and supported the creation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The Marshall Plan was structured so as to encourage and stimulate European reconciliation and cooperation: the US insisted on an international conference chaired by a Eu-


european, which would draw up the plans for dividing up and investing the funds (30). In the fall of 1949, in another daring act of trust, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson turned to French Foreign Affairs Minister Robert Schuman for ideas on the policies that should be adopted toward Germany. For eight months Schuman agonized without finding an answer and the US administration waited (31). Meanwhile the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear bomb, China became communist and tension rose on the Korean Peninsula. Thanks to an idea of French Planning Commissioner Jean Monnet the French government finally came up with a courageous initiative. Later the US made the first sizable loan to the ECSC, $100 million at the favorable rate of 3.7%.

The principle of reconciliation rarely leads to an end state. Once the cornerstone of European integration, the French-German reconciliation is no longer an isolated example. Since 1989 there have been official reconciliation processes between Germany and Poland, Germany and the Czech Republic and Hungary and Romania; Greece and Turkey have initiated steps toward a rapprochement (32). Partly because of the success of these reconciliatory processes, the EU has become one of the new hegemons in the Balkans. With the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, it has promised that the question of the final status of Kosovo (full-fledged or "conditional" independence would be decided in 2005, perhaps the thorniest of many difficult issues. Have the EU and its representatives drawn enough from their "treasure" of reconciliatory practices, from forgiving and promising and their experience of "rational" collaborations around common interests, to encourage path-breaking initiatives on the part of Serb and Albanian actors? This question asked about Greece and Turkey and the Balkans met with skepticism in Brussels and Paris in early spring 1999. Four years later comparisons of the impact of European integration on the French-German and the Greek-Turkish relationships no longer seemed farfetched (33). In 2000 former EU Commission President Jacques Delors


(32) Elizabeth Pond describes the “miracle of the present chain reaction of reconciliation in Europe” in The Rebirth of Europe cit., 10-19.

urged EU leaders to draw from their “treasure” and “find in the Balkans, on both sides...the men or the women on whom we could lean to face the principle of forgiveness and develop together a promise, of course, with the support of nearby regions such as Bulgaria and Romania among others” (34). Could this become a new chapter of the European storybook?

2.- The principle of power as action in concert

There is more to winning the peace than reconciliation. With the elimination of violent conflicts comes the affirmation of a common destiny. The early European actors launched a daring reconceptualization of power, which the treaties they negotiated were meant to symbolize. It was to be “action in concert” rather than domination over the other. But isn’t this a privilege reserved to countries that have lost the capacity to impose their will? Robert Kagan summarizes the dilemma aptly; while expressing repeatedly his admiration for the new European politics of peace, “a blessed miracle and a reason for enormous celebration- on both sides of the Atlantic”, he argues that Europeans could step out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian “paradise” of international law only thanks to the military protection of the United States. Meanwhile America must live by a “double standard”, pursuing at the same time absolute preeminence of military power and collaboration with its allies (35). Few Europeans would dispute Kagan’s point that the European Union must develop a more effective and responsible Common Defense Policy (36). But Arendt, as well as Kant, contributes to a renewed understanding of European power. She defines power as an “organized solidarity”, binding partners on a basis of equality and mutuality, not as violence or force. “To an astonishing degree independent of material factors, either of numbers or means”, power is both invincible and fragile; it “springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the mo-


ment they disperse” (37). Traces of power mark modern revolutions and manifest themselves in a “new form of government” by councils: the German Räte and the Soviets of 1918, the Hungarian Councils, the student movement, and the African-American struggle for civil rights. Often ephemeral, power changed laws and institutions in the latter case (38). Eric B. Gorham compares Monnet’s Committee for the United States of Europe and other groups of European militants, to the Arendtian councils. This must not be stretched too far, Arendt’s councils acted within the confines of a national space (39). Still, if the European “paradise” was established under US military protection, the principle of power as action in concert kept it from lapsing into a mere footnote in history books.

Paul Ricoeur marvels at Arendt’s philosophical “boldness,” which defies a long tradition in political science (40). Among political actors, power as action in concert surprised, even alienated. The negotiations on the ECSC had hardly started at the Quai d’Orsay in Paris on June 20, 1950 when the French delegates Monnet, Étienne Hirsch and Pierre Uri started arguing with one another. This went on for several days. Dirk Spierenburg, head of the Dutch delegation, confided to his assistant: “I am going crazy. How can I defend the Dutch interest when these idiots do not even know what the French interest is?” (41). Well aware of the exasperation of his colleagues, Monnet admits that for ten months he “tirelessly repeated” the same “lesson”: “We are here... to seek it [the national advantage] in the advantage of all... Only if we eliminate from our debates any particularist feelings shall we reach a solution. In so far as we, gathered here, can change our methods, the attitude of all Europeans will likewise gradually change” (42). This meant change for him as well. He had hoped for quick negotiations, they lasted over a year; he also had to accept a Council of Ministers at the insistence of the Benelux delegations who feared the domination of France and Germany in the supranational High Authority. He did not participate in the negotia-

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(37) ARENDT, Human Condition cit., 200.
(41) Max Kohnstamm interview, FJM.
tions of the Treaties of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and his initial support for the common market was lukewarm at best. But the main negotiators considered the ECSC as a “school” where the Six began learning to work together on a basis of equality (43).

Indeed the 1955-57 negotiations, this “great confrontation” (44), should be approached as a case study of power as action in concert. It is about a certain spirit, which inspires the way of adjudicating strong disagreements, the conviction that national interests are best preserved by searching for the common interest. Thanks to Maria Grazia Melechioni and Roberto Ducci, who collected the reflections of eighteen negotiators in long interviews throughout 1984, and other memoirs et essays, we have the story behind the story. These documents divulge what official declarations, memoranda and treaties never could reveal: how individual political actors changed their own minds, how they persuaded others to change their minds in order to pursue “their specific, worldly objectives”, these “interests, which lies between people and therefore can relate and bind them together” (45). It is part of the interpretative theorist’s task to expose lacunae and contradictions in the actors’ recollections. Other authoritative accounts confirm and complete rather than contradict the facts (though not necessarily the interpretations) evoked by the interviewees (46), whose humorous and often self-deprecating tales do not hide quirky behaviors and occasional pettiness.

In the Arendtian system of council, leadership springs “spontaneously” on the part of those who are willing to take responsibility for the common good. The Benelux leaders, who first dared suggest a European common market and sectoral integration of atomic energy to their partners in the ECSC in 1955, acted like council members. They initiated action, although their claim to authority “rested on nothing but the confidence of their equals, and this equality was not natural but political, it was nothing they had been born with; it was the equality of those who had committed themselves to, and now were engaged in, a joint enterprise” (47). They drew strength and inspiration from their shared history: from the experience of war, which had

(43) Marjolin, Architect of European Unity cit., 274.
(45) Arendt, The Human Condition cit., 182.
(47) Arendt, On Revolution cit., 278.
made them “completely fed up with being the battleground between France and Germany”; from the customs union which they had conceived during WWII and eventually put in place in 1947 for political reasons over the objections of civil servants and experts; and from the Beyen Plan for a customs union expanded to the Six proposed by the Netherlands already in 1952, but which even the Dutch cabinet “had not endorsed convincingly at the time” (48). It was the kernel of a much revised proposal, the Benelux Memorandum of 1955.

Maurice Faure and Robert Marjolin, the two senior French negotiators, readily admit that France brought the largest number of issues to the table. The common market meant for France, “To give up the ghosts of the past and move toward a different world which was foreign to her and conflicted deeply with the national temperament” (49). The story of the negotiations revolves largely around the need to reconcile the different interest and hidden assumptions of the six partners, especially those of France and Germany, and the growing understanding, even “complicity”, among the negotiators, which facilitated agreements (50). This process was especially taxing for the members of the Institutional Committee, who transformed the promises contracted by the Six into two treaties. They began their work in the fall of 1956 – “Before then there was nothing to write yet” – under the chairmanship of Roberto Ducci, and they met when the committees on Euratom and on the Common Market were in recess in order to hear their opinions. This indispensable, but draconian, regime of continuous meetings, seven days a week, brought everyone “close to a nervous breakdown!” (51). But Pierre Pescaatore, a young lawyer, who had represented Luxembourg at the UN and knew that small countries carry little weight in international negotiations, recalls his work on the Institutional Committee as “an extraordinary experience of deep conversion. I came to defend the national interest, and discovered with astonishment Italian, German and French representa-
tives who were able to participate with great objectivity, and to conciliate national interests with the general interests. So I tried to play a European role and to look at things from the point of view of the common interest. The sharing of tasks was spontaneous...If our committee could not agree...We preferred to solve problems among us...We only asked for political approval. As a committee we tried to think of the long-term consequences of the legal dispositions and to create a coherent body of legal dispositions. This explains the solidity and perennial character of the Rome Treaties” (52).

This did not prevent the distinguished representatives to fight like cats and dogs over the attribution of European institutions to their respective capitals after the signature ceremony (53). Assuredly, accords on the EEC and Euratom could not have been negotiated and implemented if they had not corresponded to the fulfillment of national interests and had not been approved, at least tacitly, by popular opinion. Circumstances also played their role. The Crisis of Suez and the Hungarian Revolution of October 1956 convinced the negotiators, the French in particular, that they could not go it alone anymore and that protectionist policies must be altered. But even if securing material benefits for large social groups had been the sole aim of policy-makers, there was little unanimity, especially in France, as to what such policies should be (54). Furthermore the psychological obstacles on the road to such accords among the Six were enormous. People do not always act in their own best interests.

European power, like a heavy door, turns on three hinges, the institutions, the calendar with its deadlines, and the initiative of political actors. Agreement is much more difficult to reach when hundreds or thousands of actors are involved in negotiating what Kalypso Nicolaïdis calls a “community of projects” (55). This is all the more reason to remember that the original Communities were founded on the conviction that to master national destinies is to act in concert. Embrac—

(52) Pierre Pescatore interview, FJM. Pescatore was later appointed to the European Court of Justice.
(55) Kalypso Nicolaïdis, We, the Peoples of Europe..., “Foreign Affairs”, Vol. 83, no. 6 (November/December 2004), 102.
ing this new kind of power is not for the faint of heart, nor is it an exercise in private virtue. To its inhabitants the “paradise” feels more often like a purgatory (56).

3. - The principle of the recognition of the other

Without recognition of the other, the European Union (before 1992 the European Communities) could not have “enlarged” from six to twenty-five Member States in thirty years. The Treaties of Rome’s signatories called “upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts” (57). The major contemporary theorist of reconciliation, Charles Taylor, analyzes from his standpoint as a bilingual Quebecois deeply engaged in Canadian politics and as a scholar of Hegel the process of interactions, which facilitates the coming together of parties previously opposed (or merely disconnected). The new association, far from abolishing the parties, helps them toward a higher stage of individual and collective self-realization. This is the goal, if not the reality, of EU enlargement, a neologism for the peaceful expansion of a “union” of democratic nation-states, driven not by a pre-established plan, but by the requests of outsiders to join.

In a world where social and international hierarchies have collapsed among individuals and groups - this is the case of the European continent - the shaping of identity does not follow automatically or exclusively from one’s status at birth, but it depends also on a dialogue of recognition among equals. Taylor argues that contemporary individuals and collectivities are torn between two impulses. The first is “the search of authenticity”, their specific and unique calling, which recognition by the other supports (whereas the refusal to grant recognition can have severe psychological and political consequences). The second impulse is instrumental rationality, which prizes efficacy and productivity over all else, even at the cost of shared tradition (58). The successive enlargements represent both a rational effort to modernize Europe and the vocation to create a new European order open

(56) The Rome Treaties were signed for an “unlimited” duration. Article 1-60 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe proposes a significant change by setting up a procedure of voluntary withdrawal from the EU for any Member State wishing to do so. Is this wise? All will depend on how Member States interpret article 1-5 of the Constitution, which enjoins them to practice “sincere cooperation” with each other “in full mutual respect”.

(57) Preamble of the Rome Treaty establishing the European Economic Community.

to all. But in this ceaselessly changing EU, Member States, Candidate States and their citizens experience rude challenges to their sense of identity. In this context, institutions and policies matter: they embody the granting (or withdrawal) of recognition so necessary to the self-realization of the community members (59). Certain EU policies and institutional arrangements have facilitated mutual recognition among Member States, which is predicated on the equality of treatment and status and a continuous flow of verbal, political and economic exchanges. Very briefly stated, they are:

- Institutions: the representation of all Member States on the Commission, the careful weighing of votes in the Council of Ministers, and the rotation of the European Presidency institutionalized recognition. This has transformed the self-understanding of the partners by permitting small and medium-sized States, as well as large ones, to initiate continent-wide proposals. For instance, Luxembourg played a key role in the negotiations on the Monetary Union; Portugal launched the Lisbon Agenda; Sweden and Finland have impacted transparency, the protection of the environment and peacekeeping operations. The Constitutional Treaty establishes a new permanent chair for the European Council, which may weaken the dialogue of recognition among States whose resources vary greatly (60). On the other hand, the new Barroso Commission is the first where the “big” nations are on the same footing as the smaller ones, each having one Commissioner only.

- Policies: the (modest) redistribution of economic resources from richer to poorer States and regions through programs of “economic and social cohesion”, which remains “an important expression of European solidarity” (61). The four Countries that received the most (as a proportion of GDP) from the Structural and Cohesion Funds, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, have prospered. But the austere EU budget figures under consideration for the 2007-2013 financial perspective would curtail this form of recognition for the ten

(59) “For from Hegel’s principle that there can be no disembodied spiritual life it follows that he cannot accept a definition of freedom like that of the Stoics, which sees it as an inner condition of man unaffected by his external fate...Freedom is only real (wirklich) when expressed in a form of life; and since man cannot live on his own, this must be a collective form of life”. Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979), 51.

(60) The rotating Presidency is “the most visible symbol of the EU’s shared leadership”. Nicolaides, We, the Peoples of Europe... cit., 107.

new Member States. Another policy is the granting of equal status to all the languages spoken in the Member States because no one must be put at a disadvantage by having to speak, read or write a foreign tongue. (62).

Dialogues of recognition, which can only succeed among equals, require a horizon of shared values according to Taylor. In the EU since 1993 the Copenhagen criteria for accession have constituted this horizon: democratic rights, a functioning market economy, and the acquis communautaire. (63). The European Council has now decided to begin accession negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005. In order to obtain this, Turkey entered a process of self-transformation by abolishing the death penalty, limiting the power of the military in its government, and by allowing broadcasting and education in Kurdish and other languages. Kemal Kirisci notes that, “Even the extremely touchy subject of the Armenian massacres of 1915 that once could not be raised is actually being debated in the public”. But the many conditions and reservations that accompany the EU decision – the negotiations may not end up with the accession of Turkey and “long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguards…may be considered…for areas such as freedom of movement, structural policies or agriculture” – signals at both the practical and symbolic levels the divisions among EU Member States. A first group (mostly the Mediterranean countries, Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Finland and Sweden) argues that the EU must respect its previous decisions and treat Turkey equally as all other previous and current Candidates. The second group, led especially by France and Austria, fears the rise of immigration and invokes also cultural incompatibilities. Meanwhile, many Turks simply see these conditions “as a reflection of a European rejection” (64). If the difficult question of the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey (and the not-unrelated issue of a fair power-sharing agreement between the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots) can be solved in time, the negotiations...

(62) This policy, which is most in evidence in the European Parliament’s numerous translation cabins, cost $2 a year per citizen in the EU of 15 according to Commissioner Neil Kinnock, The European union is ready for its 10 new members and their languages, “Financial Times”, Monday December 16, 2002.

(63) The acquis communautaire is the large body of laws and implementing legislation adopted by the EU since 1950, which sets ever more constraining terms over accession negotiations.

will bring Turkey’s diplomats together with the representatives of 25 Member States (27 in 2007), to discuss over 90,000 pages of *acquis communautaire*. In this context, will Turkey experience the give and take of the dialogue of recognition? Can the Member States be open to the possibility that this dialogue will transform them also?

The common feature of the European principles of action is that they engage the other – sometimes a rival or an enigma, never an enemy – on the basis of mutuality, with a view to common long-term interests and the willingness to enter binding commitments. Reconciliation, power as action in concert and recognition of the other need not inspire every policy. They should rather be considered as a logical necessity inscribed in the psychology of the citizens and their representatives if the community is to last. The expansion of direct democracy in the EU calls for more civic involvement, on a knowledgeable basis. This constitutes a formidable pedagogical challenge, which has yet to be met adequately by EU leaders in spite of the respected Commission Vice-president in charge of communication strategy Margot Wallström’s repeated calls for action (65). Yet numerous grassroots groups moved the reconciliatory process after WWII; since 1989, beside politicians and bureaucrats, academics, students, workers and journalists have engaged in the dialogue of recognition across borders (66). Provided with enough evidence, many more EU citizens could identify with the core practices of the European “treasure”.

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